Focal points and payoff information in tacit bargaining

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2019.01.008zbMath1419.91193OpenAlexW2912500825WikidataQ128499487 ScholiaQ128499487MaRDI QIDQ1735810

Andrea Isoni, Robert Sugden, Kei Tsutsui, Anders U. Poulsen

Publication date: 29 March 2019

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.01.008

zbMATH Keywords

focal pointscoordinationconflict of interestpayoff informationpayoff-irrelevant cuetacit bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (2)

Group behaviour in tacit coordination games with focal points -- an experimental investigation ⋮ Overcoming coordination failure in games with focal points: an experimental investigation

Uses Software

• Z-Tree
• ORSEE

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Stake size and the power of focal points in coordination games: experimental evidence
• Focal points in pure coordination games: An experimental investigation
• The variable frame theory of focal points: An experimental study
• `Learning' with no feedback in a competitive guessing game.
• Gender-based focal points
• Coordination and learning with a partial language
• Meaningful learning and transfer of learning in games played repeatedly without feedback
• Learning How to Cooperate: Optimal Play in Repeated Coordination Games
• Stated Beliefs and Play in Normal-Form Games
• The Role of Information in Bargaining: An Experimental Study
• A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games

This page was built for publication: Focal points and payoff information in tacit bargaining