Designing mechanisms to focalize welfare-improving strategies
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Publication:1735813
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2019.02.002zbMath1419.91525OpenAlexW2912607242MaRDI QIDQ1735813
Daniel E. Fragiadakis, Peter Troyan
Publication date: 29 March 2019
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.02.002
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Experimental studies (91A90) Matching models (91B68)
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Uses Software
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