Stability, optimality and manipulation in matching problems with weighted preferences

DOI10.3390/a6040782zbMath1461.05170OpenAlexW2074498497MaRDI QIDQ1736594

Francesca Rossi, Maria Silvia Pini, Toby Walsh, Kristen Brent Venable

Publication date: 26 March 2019

Published in: Algorithms (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/a6040782

zbMATH Keywords

stable matchingmanipulationweighted preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Edge subsets with special properties (factorization, matching, partitioning, covering and packing, etc.) (05C70) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (4)

Local search approaches in stable matching problems ⋮ Stability, optimality and manipulation in matching problems with weighted preferences ⋮ Editorial: Special issue on matching under preferences ⋮ Stable fractional matchings

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Incompleteness and incomparability in preference aggregation: complexity results
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Stable marriage and indifference
• The structure of stable marriage with indifference
• Local search approaches in stable matching problems
• Stability, optimality and manipulation in matching problems with weighted preferences
• Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 1.
• Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
• Determining Possible and Necessary Winners Given Partial Orders
• Gale-Shapley Stable Marriage Problem Revisited: Strategic Issues and Applications
• Distributed Stable Matching Problems
• When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
• Anarchy, Stability, and Utopia: Creating Better Matchings
• Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
• Three Fast Algorithms for Four Problems in Stable Marriage
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Semiring-based constraint satisfaction and optimization
• From Marriages to Coalitions: A Soft CSP Approach
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

This page was built for publication: Stability, optimality and manipulation in matching problems with weighted preferences