Fair criteria for social decisions under uncertainty

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2018.10.005zbMath1419.91274OpenAlexW3125369957WikidataQ128908991 ScholiaQ128908991MaRDI QIDQ1736958

Kaname Miyagishima

Publication date: 26 March 2019

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.10.005

zbMATH Keywords

uncertaintyefficiencyseparabilityequityrationality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Welfare economics (91B15)

Related Items (1)

Efficiency, equity, and social rationality under uncertainty

Cites Work

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