Gratitude, conscience, and reciprocity: models of supplier motivation when quality is non-contractible
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Publication:1737501
DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2019.02.047zbMath1431.90023OpenAlexW2921677070WikidataQ128246248 ScholiaQ128246248MaRDI QIDQ1737501
Publication date: 23 April 2019
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2019.02.047
Applications of game theory (91A80) Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06) Principal-agent models (91B43)
Related Items (6)
Data envelopment analysis approaches for two-level production and distribution planning problems ⋮ Roles of reciprocity and fairness concerns in airline-airport systems with environmental considerations ⋮ Disclosing products' freshness level as a non-contractible quality: optimal logistics service contracts in the fresh products supply chain ⋮ Delegation in vertical relationships: the role of reciprocity ⋮ Coordinating a closed loop supply chain with fairness concern by a constant wholesale price contract ⋮ The effect of risk aversion on the optimal project resource rate
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