Optimal team size under legislative bargaining with costly recognition

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2019.02.002zbMath1411.91220OpenAlexW2914030136MaRDI QIDQ1738424

Mustafa Yildirim

Publication date: 18 April 2019

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.02.002

zbMATH Keywords

legislative bargainingvoting rulerent-seekingteam size

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Equality in legislative bargaining

Cites Work

• Majority rule in a stochastic model of bargaining
• Legislative bargaining with a stochastic surplus and costly~recognition
• Proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition
• Intra-Firm Bargaining under Non-Binding Contracts

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