Many-candidate Nash equilibria for elections involving random selection

DOI10.1007/S11009-018-9665-9zbMath1411.91020OpenAlexW2889040479WikidataQ129334602 ScholiaQ129334602MaRDI QIDQ1739382

Jeffrey S. Rosenthal

Publication date: 26 April 2019

Published in: Methodology and Computing in Applied Probability (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11009-018-9665-9

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryNash equilibriumvoter modelrandom selectionmultiple candidatesrunoff election

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Inequalities; stochastic orderings (60E15) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) History, political science (91F10)

Cites Work

• The pseudo-marginal approach for efficient Monte Carlo computations
• Candidate positioning and entry in a political competition
• Non-cooperative games
• The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Reconsidered: Some New Developments in the Theory of Spatial Competition
• Majority runoff elections: Strategic voting and Duverger's hypothesis
• Nash equilibria for voter models with randomly perceived positions

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