Consistency between principal and agent with differing time horizons: computing incentives under risk
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Publication:1740564
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2019.03.044zbMath1431.91217OpenAlexW2931637331MaRDI QIDQ1740564
Publication date: 30 April 2019
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2019.03.044
performance measuredecision analysisinvestment decisionrelative benefit cost allocationintertemporal dependencies
Decision theory (91B06) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Principal-agent models (91B43)
Related Items (2)
Robustness and approximation for the linear contract design ⋮ Principal-agent problem under the linear contract
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