Simulating the impact of heterogeneity on stability and effectiveness of international environmental agreements

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2019.03.028zbMath1431.91268OpenAlexW2923962429WikidataQ128136320 ScholiaQ128136320MaRDI QIDQ1740567

Johan Eyckmans, Irina Bakalova

Publication date: 30 April 2019

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://lirias.kuleuven.be/handle/123456789/635399

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetrygame theorysimulationOR in environment and climate changeinternational environmental agreements

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Related Items (2)

Environmental agreements, research and technological spillovers ⋮ The two-stage game approach to coalition formation: where we stand and ways to go

Cites Work

• International environmental agreements with asymmetric countries
• Can international environmental cooperation be bought?
• An infinite-horizon model of dynamic membership of international environmental agreements

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