Voluntary export restraints in a trade model with sticky price: linear and nonlinear feedback solutions

DOI10.1007/S13235-018-0251-0zbMath1411.91388OpenAlexW2765998131WikidataQ130122125 ScholiaQ130122125MaRDI QIDQ1741177

Luca Lambertini, Arsen Palestini

Publication date: 3 May 2019

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://amsacta.unibo.it/5715/1/WP1109.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

differential gamesconjectural variationsintraindustry tradeVER

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Trade models (91B60)

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Cites Work

• The feedback equilibria of a differential game of capitalism
• Nonlinear strategies in dynamic duopolistic competition with sticky prices
• Non-linear strategies in a linear quadratic differential game
• Export restraints in a model of trade with capital accumulation
• Game theory applied to dynamic duopoly problems with production constraints
• International pollution control: Cooperative versus noncooperative strategies
• On the (in)stability of nonlinear feedback solutions in a dynamic duopoly with renewable resource exploitation
• Duopoly can be more anti-competitive than monopoly
• Feedback equilibria in a dynamic renewable resource oligopoly: pre-emption, voracity and exhaustion
• Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy under Oligopoly
• Dynamic Duopolistic Competition with Sticky Prices

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