Nurturing an infant industry by Markovian subsidy schemes

DOI10.1007/S13235-018-0258-6zbMath1411.91099OpenAlexW2795715107MaRDI QIDQ1741178

Hassan Benchekroun, Ngo Van Long

Publication date: 3 May 2019

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-018-0258-6

zbMATH Keywords

tradedifferential gamesinfant industryMarkovian subsidies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Trade models (91B60) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

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Cites Work

• Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy under Oligopoly
• On Optimum Subsidy to a Learning Industry: An Aspect of the Theory of Infant-Industry Protection
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