An evolutionary analysis of growth and fluctuations with negative externalities

DOI10.1007/S13235-017-0234-6zbMath1411.91083OpenAlexW2770784951MaRDI QIDQ1741193

Anindya S. Chakrabarti, Ratul Lahkar

Publication date: 3 May 2019

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-017-0234-6

zbMATH Keywords

business cyclespotential gamesnegative externalitylogit dynamic

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic growth models (91B62) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

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• Evolution in games with randomly disturbed payoffs
• Comparative statics for aggregative games. The strong concavity case
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• Potential games
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• Contagion in financial networks
• Concavity of Production Functions and Non-Increasing Returns to Scale
• Evolutionary Implementation and Congestion Pricing
• On the Global Convergence of Stochastic Fictitious Play
• Potential games with continuous player sets

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