Expectations of fairness and trust co-evolve in environments of partial information

DOI10.1007/s13235-017-0230-xzbMath1411.91065OpenAlexW2759923300WikidataQ59613406 ScholiaQ59613406MaRDI QIDQ1741205

Joanna J. Bryson, Paul Rauwolf

Publication date: 3 May 2019

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-017-0230-x

zbMATH Keywords

trustfairnesspartial informationtrust gamecostly punishmentnegative pseudo-reciprocity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Games in extensive form (91A18)

Cites Work

• Prosperity is associated with instability in dynamical networks
• Delayed and inconsistent information and the evolution of trust
• Punishment does not promote cooperation under exploration dynamics when anti-social punishment is possible
• The indirect evolutionary approach to explaining fair allocations
• Fairness and trust in structured populations
• Social opportunities and the evolution of fairness
• Trust, reciprocity, and social history
• Pairwise comparison and selection temperature in evolutionary game dynamics
• Partner choice promotes cooperation: the two faces of testing with agent-based models
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Evolution of fairness in the one-shot anonymous Ultimatum Game
• Promises and Partnership
• Evolutionarily stable co-operative commitments

This page was built for publication: Expectations of fairness and trust co-evolve in environments of partial information