Matching, imitation, and coordination in networks
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Publication:1741210
DOI10.1007/s13235-018-0243-0zbMath1411.91137OpenAlexW2789166026MaRDI QIDQ1741210
Publication date: 3 May 2019
Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-018-0243-0
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