A dynamic analysis of special interest politics and electoral competition
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Publication:1741216
DOI10.1007/s13235-018-0241-2zbMath1411.91218OpenAlexW2788726093MaRDI QIDQ1741216
Ganesh Manjhi, Meeta Keswani Mehra
Publication date: 3 May 2019
Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-018-0241-2
differential gamespolitical economyelectoral competitionfinancial contributioninterest groupregulatory benefit
Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Voting theory (91B12) Public goods (91B18)
Cites Work
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