A dynamic analysis of special interest politics and electoral competition

DOI10.1007/s13235-018-0241-2zbMath1411.91218OpenAlexW2788726093MaRDI QIDQ1741216

Ganesh Manjhi, Meeta Keswani Mehra

Publication date: 3 May 2019

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-018-0241-2

zbMATH Keywords

differential gamespolitical economyelectoral competitionfinancial contributioninterest groupregulatory benefit

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Voting theory (91B12) Public goods (91B18)

Cites Work

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