Tempered best response dynamics

DOI10.1007/s00182-017-0575-9zbMath1391.91044OpenAlexW2208696203MaRDI QIDQ1742135

Dai Zusai

Publication date: 11 April 2018

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.cla.temple.edu/RePEc/documents/DETU_13_01.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

switching costspayoff monotonicityproper equilibriumstatus-quo biasbest response dynamicpiecewise differential equations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items

Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance ⋮ Interior Convergence Under Payoff Monotone Selections and Proper Equilibrium: Application to Equilibrium Selection ⋮ Statistical inference in evolutionary dynamics ⋮ Stable biased sampling ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics in heterogeneous populations: a general framework for an arbitrary type distribution ⋮ Evolutionary imitative dynamics with population-varying aspiration levels ⋮ A stochastic stability analysis with observation errors in normal form games ⋮ Tributes to Bill Sandholm

Uses Software

• Dynamo

Cites Work

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