The core and the steady bargaining set for convex games

DOI10.1007/s00182-017-0576-8zbMath1391.91017OpenAlexW2606056701MaRDI QIDQ1742136

Carles Rafels, Josep Maria Izquierdo

Publication date: 11 April 2018

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/120240

zbMATH Keywords

corecooperative gamebargaining setconvex games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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• Cores of convex games
• Quasi-Cores in a Monetary Economy with Nonconvex Preferences
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• The kernel of a cooperative game
• Existence of stable payoff configurations for cooperative games
• Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games
• Average monotonic cooperative games

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