The core and the steady bargaining set for convex games
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Publication:1742136
DOI10.1007/s00182-017-0576-8zbMath1391.91017OpenAlexW2606056701MaRDI QIDQ1742136
Carles Rafels, Josep Maria Izquierdo
Publication date: 11 April 2018
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/120240
Cites Work
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- Cores of convex games
- Quasi-Cores in a Monetary Economy with Nonconvex Preferences
- The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
- The kernel of a cooperative game
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