Consistency and the core in games with externalities

DOI10.1007/s00182-017-0581-yzbMath1416.91023OpenAlexW2626299809MaRDI QIDQ1742141

Takaaki Abe

Publication date: 11 April 2018

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0581-y

zbMATH Keywords

consistencycorereduced gamegames with externalities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items

Stable coalition structures in symmetric majority games: a coincidence between myopia and farsightedness ⋮ Population monotonic allocation schemes for games with externalities ⋮ Coalition formation problems with externalities ⋮ Core stability of the Shapley value for cooperative games ⋮ Cartel formation in Cournot competition with asymmetric costs: a partition function approach

Cites Work

• Externalities, potential, value and consistency
• The coalition structure core is accessible
• A recursive core for partition function form games
• Sharing the surplus: An extension of the Shapley value for environments with externalities
• The separability axiom and equal-sharing methods
• On the reduced game property and its converse
• A set of axioms for a value for partition function games
• Reduced games, consistency, and the core
• Values of games in partition function form
• The non-emptiness of the core of a partition function form game
• Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
• Expectation formation rules and the core of partition function games
• Efficiency in coalition games with externalities
• THE CORE AND CONSISTENCY PROPERTIES: A GENERAL CHARACTERISATION
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• The kernel of a cooperative game
• AN AXIOM SYSTEM FOR A VALUE FOR GAMES IN PARTITION FUNCTION FORM