Optimal deterrence of cooperation

DOI10.1007/s00182-017-0584-8zbMath1407.91025OpenAlexW2437047273MaRDI QIDQ1742146

Stéphane Gonzalez, Aymeric Lardon

Publication date: 11 April 2018

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0584-8

zbMATH Keywords

Cournot oligopolyaxiomatizationTU-gamecontraction coreoptimal fine

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (1)

On the coalitional stability of monopoly power in differentiated Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies

Cites Work

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