All-pay auctions with endogenous bid timing: an experimental study
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1742149
DOI10.1007/S00182-017-0586-6zbMath1388.91083OpenAlexW2743970934MaRDI QIDQ1742149
Publication date: 11 April 2018
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0586-6
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)
Related Items (1)
Uses Software
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Two-bidder all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations, including the highly competitive case
- Favoritism in asymmetric contests: head starts and handicaps
- Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations
- Adjustment patterns and equilibrium selection in experimental signaling games
- Endogenous entry in contests
- All-pay auctions with risk-averse players
- An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction
- An experiment on first-price common-value auctions with asymmetric information structures: the blessed winner
- The all-pay auction with complete information
- Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information: The two-player case
- Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage contests
- Bimodal bidding in experimental all-pay auctions
- The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information
- Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: an experimental study
- An experimental study of costly coordination
- Behavior in all-pay auctions with incomplete information
- Two-stage contests with budget constraints: an experimental study
- Patent competition, rent dissipation, and the persistence of monopoly: The role of research budgets
- Does Experience Teach? Professionals and Minimax Play in the Lab
- All-Pay Contests
- Large Contests
This page was built for publication: All-pay auctions with endogenous bid timing: an experimental study
