Hybrid mechanisms for Vickrey-Clarke-Groves and generalized second-price bids

DOI10.1007/S00182-017-0591-9zbMath1391.91100OpenAlexW2755714806MaRDI QIDQ1742153

Patrick Hummel

Publication date: 11 April 2018

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0591-9

zbMATH Keywords

online advertisingposition auctionshybrid mechanismsgeneralized second-priceVickrey-Clarke-Groves

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

Optimal dynamic multi-keyword bidding policy of an advertiser in search-based advertising ⋮ Hybrid mechanisms for Vickrey-Clarke-Groves and generalized second-price bids

Cites Work

• Simplified mechanisms with an application to sponsored-search auctions
• Hybrid mechanisms for Vickrey-Clarke-Groves and generalized second-price bids
• Hybrid auctions.
• Hybrid auctions revisited
• Bayes-Nash equilibria of the generalized second-price auction
• Bounding the inefficiency of outcomes in generalized second price auctions
• Pricing in position auctions and online advertising
• Position Auctions with Consumer Search
• Incentives in Teams
• Bidding to the Top: VCG and Equilibria of Position-Based Auctions

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