Incentive compatible mechanisms for scheduling two-parameter job agents on parallel identical machines to minimize the weighted number of late jobs

DOI10.1016/j.dam.2017.08.026zbMath1393.90058OpenAlexW2762139366MaRDI QIDQ1744245

Sebastian Meiswinkel, Erwin Pesch, Dominik Kress

Publication date: 20 April 2018

Published in: Discrete Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2017.08.026

zbMATH Keywords

game theorymachine schedulinglogisticsalgorithmic mechanism designtruthfulness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06) Deterministic scheduling theory in operations research (90B35)

Related Items (1)

A parallel machine schedule updating game with compensations and clients averse to uncertain loss

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