On the generic robustness of solution concepts to incomplete information
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1745647
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.12.003zbMath1388.91074OpenAlexW2780835688MaRDI QIDQ1745647
Publication date: 18 April 2018
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/845646/1/On%20the%20generic%20robustness%20of%20solution%20concepts%20to%20incomplete%20information.pdf
Games involving topology, set theory, or logic (91A44) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Spaces of games (91A70)
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Essential equilibria of discontinuous games
- A structure theorem for rationalizability in the normal form of dynamic games
- Essential equilibria in normal-form games
- Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
- Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge
- Interim correlated rationalizability in infinite games
- Genericity and Robustness of Full Surplus Extraction
- Higher Order Uncertainty and Information: Static and Dynamic Games
- Existence and Stability of Nash Equilibrium
- Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
- The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information
- On the structure of rationalizability for arbitrary spaces of uncertainty
- Critical Types
- A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements
- Finite Order Implications of Common Priors
This page was built for publication: On the generic robustness of solution concepts to incomplete information
