Game-theoretic modeling of players' ambiguities on external factors
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1745650
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.12.008zbMath1388.91066arXiv1510.06812OpenAlexW2963782217MaRDI QIDQ1745650
Publication date: 18 April 2018
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1510.06812
Related Items
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Ellsberg games
- Ambiguous act equilibria
- Uncertainty aversion and equilibrium existence in games with incomplete information
- Stochastic orders
- Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
- Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
- Sealed bid auctions with uncertainty averse bidders
- Equilibrium in abstract economies without ordered preferences
- An equilibrium existence theorem without complete of transitive preferences
- The set of Nash equilibria of a supermodular game is a complete lattice
- Nash equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty: Breaking down backward induction
- Preference, rationalizability and equilibrium
- Equilibrium in beliefs under uncertainty
- Ambiguous games
- On a reformulation of Cournot-Nash equilibria
- Non-additive beliefs and strategic equilibria
- Monotone equilibria in Bayesian games of strategic complementarities
- The nonatomic supermodular game
- Hierarchies of ambiguous beliefs
- A lattice-theoretical fixpoint theorem and its applications
- Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms
- Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
- Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Monotone Comparative Statics
- Savage games
- Mechanism Design With Ambiguous Communication Devices
- Continuity Properties of Paretian Utility
- Upper and Lower Probabilities Induced by a Multivalued Mapping
- Competitive Equilibria in Markets with a Continuum of Traders and Incomplete Preferences
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
- "Beliefs about Beliefs" without Probabilities
This page was built for publication: Game-theoretic modeling of players' ambiguities on external factors
