Sender-receiver games with cooperation

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.03.002zbMath1396.91038OpenAlexW2611956130MaRDI QIDQ1748370

Françoise Forges, Ulrich Horst

Publication date: 9 May 2018

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/20093

zbMATH Keywords

information transmissioncommitmentperfect Bayesian equilibriumcheap talkincentive compatibility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (1)

Strategic information transmission with sender's approval

Cites Work

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• Long Cheap Talk

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