Subgame perfect equilibria in majoritarian bargaining

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.03.007zbMath1388.91107OpenAlexW3125642885MaRDI QIDQ1748376

Andrey Meshalkin, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Arkadi Predtetchinski

Publication date: 9 May 2018

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/7716b1f5-7d4c-4e45-967c-4bc24a896452

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic gamesbargainingsubgame perfect equilibriumdelay of acceptancemajoritarian voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Legislative bargaining with teams

Cites Work

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