Optional interactions and suspicious behaviour facilitates trustful cooperation in prisoners dilemma

DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2017.08.025zbMath1394.91049OpenAlexW2753726634WikidataQ47299321 ScholiaQ47299321MaRDI QIDQ1749007

Martin A. Nowak, Krishnendu Chatterjee, Tadeas Priklopil

Publication date: 15 May 2018

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.08.025

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary game theorypartial informationevolution of cooperationoptional interactionsnon-social behaviour

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (1)

Evolution of cooperation in public goods games with stochastic opting-out

Cites Work

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• Effects of information and group structure on evolution of altruism: analysis of two-score model by covariance and contextual analyses
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• Indirect reciprocity with optional interactions
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• The extended reciprocity: strong belief outperforms persistence
• Via Freedom to Coercion: The Emergence of Costly Punishment
• Voluntarily Separable Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
• The Calculus of Selfishness

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