Secret, verifiable auctions from elections
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Publication:1749541
DOI10.1016/J.TCS.2018.03.022zbMath1402.91176OpenAlexW2768859081WikidataQ130076217 ScholiaQ130076217MaRDI QIDQ1749541
Elizabeth A. Quaglia, Ben Smyth
Publication date: 17 May 2018
Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://orbilu.uni.lu/handle/10993/35916
Voting theory (91B12) Cryptography (94A60) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Authentication, digital signatures and secret sharing (94A62)
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- Auctions with entry
- Secret, verifiable auctions from elections
- NM-CPA secure encryption with proofs of plaintext knowledge
- Receipt-free secret-ballot elections (extended abstract)
- Multi-Authority Secret-Ballot Elections with Linear Work
- End-to-End Verifiable Elections in the Standard Model
- Secure Vickrey Auctions without Threshold Trust
- Coercion-Resistant Electronic Elections
- How To Prove Yourself: Practical Solutions to Identification and Signature Problems
- Financial Cryptography
- How Not to Prove Yourself: Pitfalls of the Fiat-Shamir Heuristic and Applications to Helios
- Arithmetic, first-order logic, and counting quantifiers
- Formal Verification of e-Auction Protocols
- Simulation-Sound NIZK Proofs for a Practical Language and Constant Size Group Signatures
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