On the efficiency of all-pay mechanisms

DOI10.1007/s00453-017-0296-2zbMath1390.91141DBLPjournals/algorithmica/ChristodoulouST18OpenAlexW2281780232WikidataQ59614980 ScholiaQ59614980MaRDI QIDQ1751086

George Christodoulou, Alkmini Sgouritsa, Bo Tang

Publication date: 23 May 2018

Published in: Algorithmica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00453-017-0296-2

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumall-pay auctionprice of anarchy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

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• Auctions of heterogeneous objects
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• Potential games
• Inefficiency of Standard Multi-unit Auctions
• Welfare Guarantees for Proportional Allocations
• Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules
• All-Pay Contests
• Uniform Price Auctions: Equilibria and Efficiency
• The price of anarchy in large games
• Simultaneous auctions are (almost) efficient
• Composable and efficient mechanisms
• Efficiency Loss in a Network Resource Allocation Game
• Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions

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