Fractional solutions for capacitated NTU-games, with applications to stable matchings

DOI10.1016/j.disopt.2015.02.002zbMath1390.91027OpenAlexW1630620934MaRDI QIDQ1751188

Péter Biró, Tamás Fleiner

Publication date: 24 May 2018

Published in: Discrete Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.disopt.2015.02.002

zbMATH Keywords

corestable matchingScarf lemmastable allocationNTU-gameshospitals/residents problem with couples

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items

Matching couples with Scarf's algorithm ⋮ Allocation with Weak Priorities and General Constraints ⋮ Analysis of stochastic matching markets ⋮ Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems ⋮ Stable fractional matchings ⋮ Fractional matching markets ⋮ Refugee allocation in the setting of hedonic games ⋮ On the complexity of stable fractional hypergraph matching ⋮ Random matching under priorities: stability and no envy concepts

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