The precore: converse consistent enlargements and alternative axiomatic results
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Publication:1752353
DOI10.1007/s11750-017-0463-2zbMath1390.91031OpenAlexW2769269860MaRDI QIDQ1752353
Publication date: 24 May 2018
Published in: Top (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-017-0463-2
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Cites Work
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- A new approach to the core and Weber set of multichoice games
- An Axiomatization of the Core of Market Games
- Cores and related solution concepts for multi-choice games
- Consistent extensions and subsolutions of the core for the multichoice transferable-utility games
- The kernel of a cooperative game
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