The effect of sanctions on the evolution of cooperation in linear division of labor

DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2017.10.007zbMath1394.91046OpenAlexW2765569445WikidataQ47289720 ScholiaQ47289720MaRDI QIDQ1752367

Hayato Shimura, Susumu Ohnuma, Yoko Kitakaji, Mayuko Nakamaru

Publication date: 24 May 2018

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2115/72350

zbMATH Keywords

monitoringsocial dilemmacommon-pool resource managementillegal dumpingreplicator equation for asymmetric games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Theory of organizations, manpower planning in operations research (90B70)

Related Items (1)

Dynamics of asymmetric division of labor game with environmental feedback

Cites Work

• Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
• Should law keep pace with society? Relative update rates determine the co-evolution of institutional punishment and citizen contributions to public goods
• The coevolution of altruism and punishment: role of the selfish punisher
• Games of corruption: how to suppress illegal logging
• Evolution of division of labor: emergence of different activities among group members
• The Evolution of Cooperation
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics

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