The consequences of a one-sided externality in a dynamic, two-agent framework

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2016.07.045zbMath1394.91291OpenAlexW2520423369MaRDI QIDQ1752807

Georg Müller-Fürstenberger, Ingmar Schumacher

Publication date: 24 May 2018

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2016.07.045

zbMATH Keywords

overlapping generationspoverty trapenvironmental qualitycapital market integration

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic growth models (91B62) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Related Items (2)

Pollution in a globalized world: Are debt transfers among countries a solution? ⋮ A model of river pollution as a dynamic game with network externalities

Cites Work

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• Optimal growth with pollution: how to use pollution permits?
• The environmental Kuznets curve in a world of irreversibility
• Trade's dynamic solutions to transboundary pollution
• International and Intergenerational Environmental Externalities
• North-South Trade and the Environment
• A Contribution to the Empirics of Economic Growth

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