Empirical relevance of ambiguity in first-price auctions
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Publication:1753055
DOI10.1016/j.jeconom.2018.02.001zbMath1452.62877OpenAlexW3121348662MaRDI QIDQ1753055
Gaurab Aryal, Serafin Grundl, Dong-Hyuk Kim, Yu Zhu
Publication date: 25 May 2018
Published in: Journal of Econometrics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:074c972/UQ074c972_OA.pdf
Applications of statistics to economics (62P20) Bayesian inference (62F15) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (7)
Robust inference in first-price auctions: overbidding as an identifying restriction ⋮ Two results on auctions with endogenous entry ⋮ Approximate Bayesian implementation and exact maxmin implementation: an equivalence ⋮ Procurements with Bidder Asymmetry in Cost and Risk-Aversion ⋮ Sequential auctions with ambiguity ⋮ Empirical relevance of ambiguity in first-price auctions ⋮ Efficient implementation with interdependent valuations and maxmin agents
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