Approximate efficiency and strategy-proofness for moneyless mechanisms on single-dipped policy domain

DOI10.1007/s10898-017-0586-xzbMath1410.91204OpenAlexW2768645618MaRDI QIDQ1753138

Qiaoming Han, Yicheng Xu, Dong-lei Du, Da-Chuan Xu

Publication date: 25 May 2018

Published in: Journal of Global Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10898-017-0586-x

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyapproximation algorithmPareto-optimalstrategy-proofmechanism designanonymous

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Discrete location and assignment (90B80) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

Strategy-proof mechanisms for obnoxious facility game with bounded service range

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Strategy-proof approximation mechanisms for an obnoxious facility game on networks
• Efficient and strategy-proof social choice when preferences are single-dipped
• Group strategy-proofness and voting between two alternatives
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Strategy-proof division of a private good when preferences are single-dipped
• On the likelihood of single-peaked preferences
• Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results
• Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
• Mix and match: a strategyproof mechanism for multi-hospital kidney exchange
• Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences
• Characterizing Mechanisms in Obnoxious Facility Game
• Strategyproof Approximation of the Minimax on Networks
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision