An experiment on first-price common-value auctions with asymmetric information structures: the blessed winner

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.013zbMath1390.91145OpenAlexW2774017197WikidataQ57935157 ScholiaQ57935157MaRDI QIDQ1753270

Rajiv Sarin, Brit Grosskopf, Lucas Rentschler

Publication date: 29 May 2018

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://hdl.handle.net/10871/30911

zbMATH Keywords

auctionspublic informationasymmetric information structuresunderbidding

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (1)

All-pay auctions with endogenous bid timing: an experimental study

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Testing static game theory with dynamic experiments: A case study of public goods
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• Cursed Equilibrium
• Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?
• Endogenous entry and exit in common value auctions

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