Equilibrium informativeness in veto games

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.11.010zbMath1390.91069OpenAlexW3122749082MaRDI QIDQ1753277

Dmitry Lubensky, Eric Schmidbauer

Publication date: 29 May 2018

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.11.010

zbMATH Keywords

cheap talknon-compliancevetophysician-induced demand

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (1)

A dynamic multi-player bargaining game with veto players

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Veto-based delegation
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Authority and Communication in Organizations
• Optimal Delegation
• Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria

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