Failure of common knowledge of language in common-interest communication games

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.014zbMath1390.91068OpenAlexW3122589093MaRDI QIDQ1753280

Andreas Blume

Publication date: 29 May 2018

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.014

zbMATH Keywords

communicationlanguageinformation transmissioncommon knowledgemeaning

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items

Endogenous ambiguity and rational miscommunication ⋮ Toxic types and infectious communication breakdown ⋮ Fragile meaning -- an experiment ⋮ Cheap talk with coarse understanding ⋮ Communication under language barriers

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Voronoi languages: equilibria in cheap-talk games with high-dimensional types and few signals
• Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
• Communication under language barriers
• How much common belief is necessary for a convention?
• When mandatory disclosure hurts: Expert advice and conflicting interests
• Language Barriers
• Learning How to Cooperate: Optimal Play in Repeated Coordination Games
• Language and the Theory of the Firm
• Rendezvous Search: A Personal Perspective
• Strategic Information Transmission
• The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information
• Hide-and-Seek Games on a Network, Using Combinatorial Search Paths
• A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements