The lattice of envy-free matchings
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Publication:1753285
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.016zbMath1390.91246OpenAlexW2782194353MaRDI QIDQ1753285
Publication date: 29 May 2018
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.016
Related Items (14)
The lattice of worker-quasi-stable matchings ⋮ Constrained-optimal tradewise-stable outcomes in the one-sided assignment game: a solution concept weaker than the core ⋮ The lattice of envy-free many-to-many matchings with contracts ⋮ Envy-free matchings in bipartite graphs and their applications to fair division ⋮ Envy-freeness and relaxed stability for lower-quotas: a parameterized perspective ⋮ Optimal cost-based allocations under two-sided preferences ⋮ Popular critical matchings in the many-to-many setting ⋮ Entering classes in the college admissions model ⋮ The envy-free matching problem with pairwise preferences ⋮ Envy-free matchings with lower quotas ⋮ Envy-freeness and relaxed stability: hardness and approximation algorithms ⋮ College admissions with ties and common quotas: integer programming approach ⋮ Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching markets ⋮ Random matching under priorities: stability and no envy concepts
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