Goal setting in the principal-agent model: weak incentives for strong performance

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.12.017zbMath1390.91229OpenAlexW3126055998WikidataQ130076252 ScholiaQ130076252MaRDI QIDQ1753293

Roberto Hernán-González, Brice Corgnet, Joaquin Gómez-Miñambres

Publication date: 29 May 2018

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.017

zbMATH Keywords

laboratory experimentsprincipal-agent modelsreference-dependent utilitygoal settingincentive theorynon-monetary incentives

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (5)

Equity-based incentive to coordinate shareholder-manager interests under information asymmetry ⋮ When are two portfolios better than one? A prospect theory approach ⋮ Motivational goal bracketing: an experiment ⋮ Robustness and approximation for the linear contract design ⋮ Principal-agent problem under the linear contract

Cites Work

• Does monitoring decrease work effort? The complementarity between agency and crowding-out theories
• Job-market signaling and screening: An experimental comparison
• Efficient contracting and fair play in a simple principal-agent experiment
• Do sellers offer menus of contracts to separate buyer types? An experimental test of adverse selection theory
• Firing threats: incentive effects and impression management
• A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences*
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation

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