Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object preferences: characterization of minimum price rule
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Publication:1753294
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.019zbMath1390.91228OpenAlexW3124122639MaRDI QIDQ1753294
Publication date: 29 May 2018
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.019
efficiencystrategy-proofnessequilibrium structurecommon-object-ranking domaincommon-tiered-object domainminimum price rulenon-quasi-linearitynormal-richness
General equilibrium theory (91B50) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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