Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.021zbMath1390.91067OpenAlexW2791395059MaRDI QIDQ1753295

Drew Fudenberg, Yuichiro Kamada

Publication date: 29 May 2018

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/123086

zbMATH Keywords

rationalizabilityheterogeneous beliefsself-confirming equilibriumpurificationrandom matchingextensive-form games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (6)

Payoff information and learning in signaling games ⋮ Ambiguity attitudes and self-confirming equilibrium in sequential games ⋮ Equilibria of nonatomic anonymous games ⋮ Observability, dominance, and induction in learning models ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Discovery and equilibrium in games with unawareness

Cites Work

• Rationalizable conjectural equilibrium: Between Nash and rationalizability
• Learning to play Bayesian games.
• Learning in extensive-form games. I: Self-confirming equilibria
• Payoff information and self-confirming equilibrium
• Structural Consistency, Consistency, and Sequential Rationality
• Sequential Equilibria
• Considerations of Fairness and Strategy: Experimental Data from Sequential Games
• Rationalizable conjectural equilibrium: A framework for robust predictions
• Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium
• Self-Confirming Equilibrium
• Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium

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