Equilibrium play in voluntary ultimatum games: beneficence cannot be extorted
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Publication:1753304
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.01.006zbMath1390.91098OpenAlexW2753366591MaRDI QIDQ1753304
Vernon L. Smith, Bart J. Wilson
Publication date: 29 May 2018
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.chapman.edu/research/institutes-and-centers/economic-science-institute/_files/WorkingPapers/Equilibrium-Play-in-Voluntary-Ultimatum-Games.pdf
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Cites Work
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- Subgame perfection in ultimatum bargaining trees
- Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining
- Learning to accept in ultimatum games: Evidence from an experimental design that generates low offers
- Second chance offers versus sequential auctions: theory and behavior
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