Equilibrium selection in sequential games with imperfect information
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Publication:1753305
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.01.008zbMath1390.91041OpenAlexW2122168886MaRDI QIDQ1753305
Antonio Nicolò, Jon X. Eguia, Rebecca B. Morton, Aniol Llorente-Saguer
Publication date: 29 May 2018
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11577/3258043
multiple equilibriaequilibrium selectionimperfect informationvertical contractingpassive beliefssymmetric beliefs
Related Items (4)
Equilibrium selection in multi-leader-follower games with vertical information ⋮ Equilibrium selection in sequential games with imperfect information ⋮ Information and targeted spending ⋮ Risk aversion and equilibrium selection in a vertical contracting setting: an experiment
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