Hidden action and outcome contractibility: an experimental test of moral hazard theory
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Publication:1753310
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.02.006zbMath1390.91092OpenAlexW2793163484WikidataQ55879245 ScholiaQ55879245MaRDI QIDQ1753310
Eva I. Hoppe, Patrick W. Schmitz
Publication date: 29 May 2018
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.02.006
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Cites Work
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