Procurement auctions with ex post cooperation between capacity constrained bidders
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Publication:1753546
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2017.01.038zbMath1403.91186OpenAlexW2580488777MaRDI QIDQ1753546
Publication date: 29 May 2018
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2017.01.038
Related Items (4)
How auctioneers set reserve prices in procurement auctions ⋮ Manufacturing and procurement outsourcing strategies of competing original equipment manufacturers ⋮ The beauty of Dutch: ex-post split-award auctions in procurement markets with diseconomies of scale ⋮ Ex anteandEx postSubcontracting between Two Competing Bidders
Cites Work
- Procurement auctions with capacity constrained suppliers
- Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: analytic solutions to the general case
- First-price auctions where one of the bidders' valuations is common knowledge
- Optimal procurement mechanisms for divisible goods with capacitated suppliers
- How to subcontract?
- Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities.
- The all-pay auction with complete information
- Private versus complete information in auctions
- Better, Faster, Cheaper: An Experimental Analysis of a Multiattribute Reverse Auction Mechanism with Restricted Information Feedback
- Estimation of a Dynamic Auction Game
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