Imperfect public monitoring with a fear of signal distortion

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.004zbMath1422.91036OpenAlexW3125614942MaRDI QIDQ1753675

Vivek Bhattacharya, Ludwig Straub, Lucas Manuelli

Publication date: 29 May 2018

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.004

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesambiguity aversionlinearityimperfect public monitoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

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