College assignment as a large contest
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Publication:1753683
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.006zbMath1422.91547OpenAlexW2312234815MaRDI QIDQ1753683
Brent R. Hickman, Aaron L. Bodoh-Creed
Publication date: 29 May 2018
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.006
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