Whether or not to open Pandora's box

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.005zbMath1420.90029OpenAlexW2108737331MaRDI QIDQ1753685

Laura Doval

Publication date: 29 May 2018

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20180131-102705515

zbMATH Keywords

information acquisitionsearch

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50)

Related Items (13)

Delegated Concept Testing in New Product Development ⋮ Procurement Mechanisms with Post-Auction Pre-Award Cost-Reduction Investigations ⋮ Strategic experimentation with random serial dictatorship ⋮ Optimal multi-unit allocation with costly verification ⋮ Legislative informational lobbying ⋮ Auction design with shortlisting when value discovery is covert ⋮ Optimal Dynamic Information Acquisition ⋮ Prices as signals of product quality in a duopoly ⋮ School choice with costly information acquisition ⋮ Optimal learning before choice ⋮ Consumer search with blind buying ⋮ Player-compatible learning and player-compatible equilibrium ⋮ Mechanism design with costly verification and limited punishments

Cites Work

• A more general Pandora rule?
• Parallel search for the best alternative
• Optimal learning before choice
• Attributes
• Simultaneous Search
• Signal Orderings Based on Dispersion and the Supply of Private Information in Auctions
• Optimal Search for the Best Alternative
• Stoppable families of alternative bandit processes
• Optimal Procurement Contracts with Pre-Project Planning
• Delegated information acquisition with moral hazard

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