A new ex-ante efficiency criterion and implications for the probabilistic serial mechanism

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.011zbMath1422.91387OpenAlexW3121216619MaRDI QIDQ1753688

Battal Doğan, Kemal Yıldız, Serhat Doğan

Publication date: 29 May 2018

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11693/48988

zbMATH Keywords

fairnessprobabilistic assignmentprobabilistic serial mechanismex-ante efficiency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Welfare economics (91B15)

Related Items (3)

A simple characterization of assignment mechanisms on set constraints ⋮ Extended random assignment mechanisms on a family of good sets ⋮ On the terminology of economic design: a critical assessment and some proposals

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